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Abstract 
The development of markets and the penetration of capital into agriculture have started the 
agrarian transition in rural China, which is transforming smallholding, household-based 
agriculture into various forms of capitalistic production. This raises again in a new historical 
and social context the long-debated question in the agrarian transition literature: Can family 
farms survive the onslaught of capitalist agriculture based on wage labor and what shapes the 
confrontation between family farms and agro-capital? I argue that it is the local political 
economy—rather than some natural obstacles in agriculture to the penetration of capitalism—
that shapes this confrontation and gives rise to a variety of local patterns in how family 
producers interact with agro-capital. Conceptually, the primary dimension in which local 
patterns diverge is how direct producers’ transactions with the product market are mediated. 
Based on this distinction, I identify three distinct local paths of agrarian transition—
agribusiness-led corporate production, independent household production, and cooperative 
production. I use data collected from fieldwork and secondary sources to show how, in each 
model, characteristics of the local pattern are shaped by the local political economy. 
 
Keywords 
agrarian transition, agribusiness, family farming, cooperatives, capitalism, China  
  1 
 Chinese agriculture is undergoing a fundamental change. In a sector that still employs around 
280 million people—67.4 percent of the total rural labor force—this change will also 
transform economic livelihoods, the social structure, and political relations in rural China. 
Philip Huang has called this change “China’s hidden agricultural revolution” (Huang, 2010a). 
It differs from the traditional agricultural revolutions that took place in other countries in both 
how it started and how it has unfolded: it is more “hidden.” First, instead of being caused by 
the use of new technologies in the agricultural sector, it is primarily driven by external 
structural changes. More specifically, Philip Huang and Yusheng Peng (2007) identified three 
relevant macro-historical trends: the declining natural growth rate of the rural population, the 
rapid transfer of rural labor into non-farm jobs, and the country’s changing food consumption 
patterns. Second, instead of creating a significant rise in crop yields, this new agricultural 
revolution mainly unfolds through a shift in agricultural production from staple grains to 
higher-value foods such as meat, poultry, vegetables, and dairy.  
Much more than merely a change in crop choice, the shift from staple grains to 
higher-value foods changes the producers in many ways. For the smallholding, family-based 
agricultural producers who still dominate China’s agricultural sector today, the shift to 
higher-value foods is simultaneously a shift from subsistence to commercial exchanges in 
their production orientation, from a reliance on the state’s grain procurement system to an 
exposure to risky and unpredictable markets in their interactions with the external 
environment, and, in their behavioral patterns, from survival-first risk-aversion to 
specialization, competition, and risk-taking. Furthermore, besides presenting unprecedented 
opportunities for smallholding family farms to achieve full employment and rising income, 
this agricultural revolution also introduces a new type of producer into rural China to 
compete with family farms: agribusiness companies. A series of changes in food 
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consumption and agricultural production—including the growing consumption of higher-
value and processed foods, the rising scale of food retailing, the increasing incidence of 
eating out, and the surging demand for industrial inputs in agricultural production—have 
made Chinese agriculture a new venue for profit making and capital accumulation. As a 
result, in the past decade, agribusiness has made a forceful entry into Chinese agriculture, 
altering the landscape of a sector that was once devoid of capitalized producers (Waldron, 
Brown, and Longworth, 2006; Zhang and Donaldson, 2008).  
Both the transformation of family farms and the entry of corporate producers suggest 
that, together with the hidden revolution in agricultural production, a fundamental social 
change is also taking place to China’s agricultural producers—one that I have called the rise 
of agrarian capitalism (Zhang and Donaldson, 2008). Chinese agriculture in the past was 
dominated by peasant producers—household-based agriculturalists who use family labor to 
produce staple grains mainly for subsistence and depend on non-commoditized relations for 
the household’s reproduction (Friedmann, 1980). This pre-capitalist, peasant form of 
production can be transformed into capitalist agriculture through two processes. Either the 
organization of production goes beyond the household unit and begins to use non-family, 
wage labor; or, if households remain the units of production, the reproduction of these family 
farms becomes commoditized—i.e., through participation in land, labor, credit, and product 
markets (Zhang and Donaldson, 2010). These are precisely the two changes that have been 
triggered by the hidden agricultural revolution and mentioned above: the transformation of 
family farms as they have shifted to specialized, market-oriented production of higher-value 
products and the emergence of supra-family, labor-hiring corporate farms.  
The entry of agro-capital and the transformation of smallholding family farms are not 
two independent processes, but are instead intertwined, and are competing with each other for 
market share, productive assets, and political influence. Even though the favorable macro-
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level economic and demographic contexts now provide family farms new opportunities to 
profit from commercial production of higher-value crops, as Huang and Peng (2007) suggest, 
these small producers may still lack the micro-level conditions—in terms of capital and skill 
endowments, market access, and local political support—to take advantage of these 
opportunities.  
From the view of neo-institutional economics, for example, one can argue that small 
agriculturalists face inherent limitations—which range from information asymmetry, risk 
averseness, and high transaction costs—when making the shift from subsistence-oriented 
grain production to market-oriented production of higher-value, cash crops. In contrast, 
agribusiness companies, while also facing some inherent obstacles in entering agriculture and 
specific restrictions in rural China, which will be elaborated on later, are much better 
equipped with capital, technologies, organizational assets, and market access than small 
household farmers. This has led to them becoming the leading force in China’s agrarian 
transition.  
Agribusiness companies also enjoy greater support from the state. Since the mid-
1990s, the central government has made it clear that it views the minuscule scale of the 
hundreds of millions of family farms in China as the main obstacle and that the “agricultural 
modernization” program it has designed for rural China will focus on raising the scale of 
production, capital investment, and market integration. The central government’s preferred 
policy vehicle for promoting its agricultural modernization agenda is vertical integration of 
agriculture by the so-called “dragon-head” agribusiness enterprises, which not only bring 
capital investment, new technologies, and market access to agriculture, but can also organize 
rural households into larger-scale production. 
Despite the advantages agribusiness may enjoy, China’s small family farms have 
proven to be resilient in the face of mounting pressures from both a state that is committed to 
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scaling up agricultural production and a market in which large firms are gaining dominance 
in downstream sectors (such as food processing, wholesaling, and retailing) and demanding 
consolidation in agricultural production. Philip Huang, Gao Yuan, and Peng Yusheng (2012), 
for example, find that hired year-workers account for only 3 percent of all labor input in 
Chinese agriculture today; they thus argue that the labor-hiring, capitalist agriculture by 
agribusiness only plays a minimal role in Chinese agriculture, and family farming still 
predominates.  
Will the penetration of agro-capital dissolve family farms, proletarianize the rural 
labor force, and transform the sector into one based on wage labor, hierarchical organizations, 
and capital-intensive production functions? Or, can family farms that mainly use family labor 
in small-scale, labor-intensive production remain viable in commoditized production and 
persist—albeit it in transformed ways? The debate about this battle between agribusiness and 
family farms in an agricultural sector undergoing a capitalist transition has energized rural 
studies for generations, starting with Lenin’s (Lenin, 1956 [1908]) famous argument about 
the dissolution of family farms resulting from the penetration of capitalist relations of 
production into agriculture. After more than a decade of heated debates in the 1970s and 
1980s between two main camps—one following a more orthodox Marxist-Leninist 
developmental logic and emphasizing the transformative power of the logic of capital (De 
Janvry, 1981; Patnaik, 1979), and the other more inspired by Chayanov’s view about the 
unique logic in household production and the resilience of family farms (Friedmann, 1978; 
Mann and Dickinson, 1978)—this literature has become largely dormant. This is partly 
because the concern about family farms has since subsided in Western countries where 
agricultural development has become characterized more by the rise of agricultural-industrial 
complexes and a global division of labor. But it is equally the result of the deductivist 
approach shared by both sides that has brought the debate to an impasse: on one hand, the 
  5 
teleological tendency in the Leninist tradition that presumes the end point of the dissolution 
of family farms by capitalist relations of production, and on the other, the essentialist 
tendency in the Chayanovian tradition that presumes the permanency of family farms on the 
basis of either a unique logic of household production or the natural features of agriculture 
(McMichael and Buttel, 1990). Both sides were particularly uneasy with variations across 
time and space in how the balance shifts between family farms and capitalist farms. Rather 
than being explained in specific social-historical contexts, such variations were either 
discounted as some transient stages in the progressive development of capitalist agriculture, 
or reified as the manifestations of unique natural features of agricultural production. 
The long-delayed onset of capitalist transition in Chinese agriculture has pushed the 
agrarian question to the forefront of social change in rural China. It not only has elevated the 
practical significance of the research on agrarian transition, as it now relates to the fate of 
hundreds of millions of smallholding household producers, but it also has provided an 
opportunity to reinvigorate this literature in a unique social-historical context. What is 
particularly interesting and challenging to the existing literature is the great amount of 
variations one finds in China. In various parts of rural China, different local models of 
transition have emerged. Family farms are disintegrated, or subsumed, or reproduced, or 
transformed, while agro-capital, on the other hand, uses either arms-length markets, 
integrated firms, or neither-market-nor-firm contract arrangements to engage in agricultural 
production. Wage labor appears in different forms, offered by proletarianized or semi-
proletarianized laborers and employed by family-based farms or agribusiness companies. 
Different forms of commoditized agricultural production can become dominant in even 
neighboring counties in the same agro-ecological region.  
The very existence of a multiplicity of local patterns of the transformation of family 
farms and the interplay between family farms and agribusinesses in a similar broad national 
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and historical context mean that such variations cannot be explained away as different stages 
in the same developmental trajectory toward a uniform capitalist agriculture. Similarly, the 
adoption of different forms of production in areas that specialize in the same agricultural 
product suggests that the persistence of family farms in some areas but not others cannot be 
fully explained by resorting to the essential qualities of agriculture or of specific crops; 
characteristics of the local political economy must be considered. Therefore, I posit that it is 
more productive to focus on the specific relations that develop between small commodity 
producers, capital, and the state and examine how local political-economic conditions shape 
such relations and interactions. More specifically, in rural China today, what are the local 
political-economic conditions that lead a specific form of commoditized agriculture to 
dominance and, as a result, give rise to a distinct local model of agrarian transition? What 
local forces and institutions produce among family farmers in the area a similar set of 
responses to and interactions with agro-capital and markets?  
In this article I draw from both firsthand fieldwork data and secondary sources to 
address these questions. My intention here is not to explain at the household level the 
economic choices made by farming families to respond to market opportunities in specific 
ways, but rather to examine on an aggregate level—the village-, township-, or county-level, 
in various cases—the local conditions that lead to the emergence of a certain aggregate 
pattern among local family farms in responding to opportunities of commoditized agriculture. 
Thus, I first conceptually identify key factors in shaping the distinctive patterns of agrarian 
transition at the local level, and then empirically compare the multiple local patterns observed 
in rural China. Two factors prove critical. First, the primary dimension in which local 
patterns of agrarian transition diverge is what mediates direct producers’ transactions with 
markets—especially the product market. Based on this, I identify two paths of agrarian 
transition—agribusiness-led corporate production and independent household production. 
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Second, the use of wage labor creates a second-order differentiation in each of the two 
models: contract farming and corporate farming in corporate production, and commercial 
farming and entrepreneurial farming in independent household production. These two 
dimensions produce a two-by-two typology of four conceptual models of agrarian transition. 
I use empirical evidence from representative localities in rural China to demonstrate how, in 
each model, the characteristics of small household producers and agribusiness and relations 
between the two are shaped by the local political economy. I also discuss an alternative 
model that may provide a third way between the dominance of labor-hiring capitalist farms 
and the persistence of smallholding family farms—cooperative production.  
 
Conceptualizing Local Paths in China’s Agrarian Transition 
As mentioned earlier, smallholding family farms face obstacles when making the shift from 
subsistence-oriented grain production to market-oriented, specialized production of 
commodity crops. Compared to subsistence agriculture, commoditized agriculture imposes 
new requirements on producers that include, first internally, the skill, labor, and capital 
investments needed for the new production and, externally, access to product markets. Many 
commodity crops do not require significant new capital investment beyond what is already 
needed for traditional grain crops. Many subsistence producers also possess the skills of 
growing these crops from operating multi-cropping farms. Furthermore, despite 
commercialization in recent years, China’s public agricultural extension system, which still 
employs a staff of 1.4 million in nearly 200,000 local-level service stations, remains the most 
developed among developing countries and the most effective in disseminating skills to rural 
producers (Hu et al., 2009). The increased demand for labor supply from shifting to 
commodity crops can also be met in most rural areas in China through either tapping into 
underemployed family labor or hiring temporary workers on local labor markets. Thus, in 
  8 
China’s case at least, it is market access that poses the greater obstacle to family producers’ 
shifting to commoditized agriculture. As a result, although the inability to meet the 
requirements of skill, labor, and capital has certainly forestalled the transition to 
commoditized agriculture in some rural areas, the ways through which direct producers gain 
market access are the main dimension that creates diverging local patterns of commoditized 
agriculture.  
Market access can be further disaggregated into informational access (the knowledge 
of not only market demands but also basic rules of the market), relational access (contact with 
transactional partners), and physical access (the ability to transport the bulky products to the 
points of transaction). The critical importance of market access in agrarian transition is 
actually related to the natural characteristics of agriculture as a land-based enterprise. The 
immovability of land restricts producers’ spatial location and mobility. It also determines the 
spatial segregation of the land-based agricultural production from urban consumption, and 
thus, makes market information, market contact, and physical market access all difficult for 
agricultural producers to obtain.  
In capitalist agriculture, commodity producers sell their products to the market and, 
through such commoditized exchange relations, socially reproduce themselves. Producers’ 
transactions with the product market, however, can be mediated in different ways, depending 
on how market access is provided to the producers. Conceptually, we can identify three 
alternatives of mediating direct producers’ transactions with the market: First, producers can 
directly transact in markets individually through gaining market information, knowing market 
contacts, and transporting products to market all on their own. Second, conversely, producers 
can have no direct transactions in the product market but rather sell their labor on the labor 
market to an external actor—an agribusiness company—and leave it entirely to the latter to 
gain the market information, contact, and physical access essential for selling on the product 
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market. There is also a third possibility, in which producers’ transactions in the product 
market are intermediated by, not an external actor, but a self-organized cooperative, which 
collectively gains market information, contacts, and physical access and makes them 
available to all individual members. These three alternatives through which small agricultural 
producers gain market access to shift into commoditized agriculture create three different 
models of agrarian transition, which I refer to as, respectively, independent household 
production, corporate production, and cooperative production. As I will show later, the three 
different ways of mediating direct producers’ transactions with the market and providing 
market access to producers also shape relations of production and how labor is used in the 
production process.  
The three competing models of agrarian transition identified here have been referred 
to in different terms in the literature, although not based on such a conceptual framework. For 
example, the official survey conducted by China’s Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) uses three 
categories of “organizational forms of agricultural industrialization”: those led by dragon-
head enterprises, by intermediary organizations, and by specialized markets (Niu, 2002; 
2006). Philip Huang (2010b) refers to these as three competing paths of vertical integration, 
but considers the specialized market-led integration an unstable and transitory path to the 
other two. Q. Forrest Zhang and John Donaldson (2010) identify six forms of non-peasant 
agricultural production, which can be grouped into independent production and corporate 
production. They do not, however, single out cooperative production because their interest is 
mainly in distinctive types of relations of production, and cooperative farming has relations 
of production similar to those of independent household-based commercial farming. 
Independent production and corporate production can be further differentiated. 
Although I do not see the use of wage labor as the exclusive indicator of the emergence of a 
capitalist agriculture, the replacement of nonwage family labor with wage labor remains a 
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critical development that represents a further penetration of commodity relations into 
production units (households, for example) and creates new relations of production. 
Therefore, two variants emerge within each of the two transitional models depending on 
whether wage labor is used in the production units.  
The use of wage labor depends on both the scale and labor-use intensity of 
agricultural production. The scale of production is constrained mainly by the availability of 
labor and land. In rural China, however, regional variations in the scale of production—and 
thus, the use of wage labor—depend less on the availability of free, commoditized labor or 
the development of labor markets locally, than on the availability of land. Given the 
miniscule scale of production and high labor-to-land ratio in most rural areas in China, local 
surplus labor or migrant labor is usually available to meet the demand for labor when it arises. 
The availability of land, on the other hand, poses the greater obstacle to both household and 
corporate producers who want to expand their production, because most of China’s farmland 
is collectively owned and has been allocated to individual rural households via long-term 
leases.  
Additional land for expanding the scale of production can only come from two 
sources: leasing unused land from the collective owners, or renting contracted farmland from 
individual households (or, sometimes, collectively from the village or villagers’ group), both 
of which depend heavily on conditions in the local political economy. Furthermore, as 
already mentioned, the miniscule scale of agricultural production is also a crucial concern for 
the central government, which sees it as the main culprit for small farming households’ lack 
of market integration, low productivity, and as a result, stagnating income. For these reasons, 
increasing the scale of production has been raised by the central government as a central goal 
in its plan for agricultural modernization. The scale of production—and related with this, the 
availability of land—are, therefore, an area where regional variations can be created by 
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different policy interventions by local governments and can lead to varied patterns of wage 
labor use in commoditized agriculture.  
From the discussion above, I derive a two-by-two typology—based on the primary 
differentiation of modes of mediating direct producers’ transactions with the product market 
and the secondary differentiation of wage labor use—that identifies four different local 
models in the two distinct paths of transition to commoditized agriculture. I will set 
cooperative production aside for a separate discussion. 
 
Table 1. A Typology of Local Models of Agrarian Transition in Rural China  
 Provision of market access 
Independent production Corporate production 
Use of wage 
labor 
Present Entrepreneurial family-farming Corporate farming 
Absent  Commercial family-farming Contract farming 
 
Under independent production in which small commodity producers enjoy access to 
market information, market contacts, and physical access to the marketplace and sell their 
products on markets, the use of wage labor differentiates entrepreneurial farmers, whose 
family farms—still owned and operated by the family—have expanded in scale and 
employed wage labor, from commercial farmers, who rely on family nonwage labor. When 
agribusiness companies provide market access to direct producers and mediate producers’ 
transactions with the product market, companies can organize production in two forms. In 
corporate farming, agribusiness companies directly set up corporate farms on leased land and 
employ wage labor in managed production. Producers, in this case, sell their labor to the 
company but have no transactions in the product market. In contract farming, direct 
producers maintain their control of land and do not enter into formal employment relations 
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with companies; hence, wage labor is not present. However, companies directly control both 
the production process and the final products of these contract farmers. For the part of 
production that is under contract, contract farmers do not sell the products on the market, but 
rather deliver them to companies per the contract.1 The next section provides details of 
specific cases of each model and discusses how the rise of a model is connected with local 
political-economic conditions. 
 
The Political Economy of Local Models of Agrarian Transition 
China’s rural reform in the early 1980s dismantled collective farming and restored 
households as the unit of production. Agricultural land, although still collectively owned by 
rural villages, was allocated to rural households on long-term leases. After an initial increase 
in productivity resulting from the rising incentives created by this institutional change, 
China’s household-based smallholding agriculture exhibited its inherent limitations. Central 
among these limitations is smallholding peasant households’ inability to participate in 
commodity markets and to respond to market demand for higher-value crops, which, as 
discussed earlier, is rooted in the inherent difficulties small agriculturalists face in getting 
access to market information, contacts, and facilities. Faced with stagnating agricultural 
productivity and rural income on one hand, and rising urban demand for higher-value, non-
1 In many cases, contract farmers receive all production inputs from companies and only 
contribute their land and family labor to the production process. The payment they receive for 
the delivered products is in essence a wage for their labor plus a rent for their land. Some 
argue that these contract farmers are merely “disguised laborers” (Clapp, 1994). This term 
further shows that, while contract farmers are not formally wage laborers, their participation 
in markets is mainly in the labor and land market, not in the product market.  
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grain foods on the other, the central government began to formulate and implement an 
agricultural modernization program in the mid-1990s. The central government’s plan is 
centered on the concept of “vertical integration”—sometimes also referred to as 
“industrialization”—which aims at transforming China’s small-scale, household-based, and 
often subsistence-oriented agriculture into a modernized agriculture, with emphasis on 
increased scale, specialized production of higher-value goods, and market-orientation. The 
MOA established a new bureaucracy, with branches at all provincial and some sub-provincial 
units, called the Office for Agricultural Industrialization 农业产业化办公室, to support this 
agenda of agricultural modernization (Huang, 2010b).  
In terms of specific policies, the central government has made efforts in two areas. 
First, the main tool selected by the central government is the so-called “dragon-head 
agribusiness companies,” which, by vertically integrating agricultural production with their 
processing and marketing operations, can help provide the much needed capital, skill, and 
market access to agriculture and organize household farmers into larger-scale production. 
Agribusiness companies, domestic and foreign alike, can acquire the “dragon-head” 
designation from various levels of government by meeting certain requirements regarding 
capital, scale, use of technology, etc., and then qualify for government support that ranges 
from bank loans and tax deductions (Guo, Jolly, and Zhu, 2007; Waldron, Brown, and 
Longworth, 2006). From 2000 to 2005, according to some estimates the central government 
had invested a total of 11.9 billion yuan to support national-level dragon-head companies 
(Huang, 2010b). Local governments have also followed the lead and have provided support 
for local-level dragon-head companies. Not surprisingly, the number of dragon-head 
companies engaged in integrated agriculture increased rapidly—nearly tenfold, from 5,381 in 
1996 to 61,268 in 2005 (Niu, 2006; Huang, 2010b). 
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The second area of the central government’s program is rural cooperatives. Here the 
program started later and has been less forceful than that for dragon-head companies. The 
central government’s first serious effort at promoting rural cooperatives began in 1998 in a 
directive issued by the State Council that legitimated and encouraged the growth of 
spontaneously formed rural cooperatives (Deng et al., 2010). Later, the MOA began to select 
rural cooperatives across the country to which it provided support as pilot programs to 
demonstrate the effectiveness of cooperatives. In 2004, the MOA invested 20 million yuan to 
support a second round of 100 rural cooperatives (Deng et al., 2010). Then, in October 2006, 
the central government gave its strongest push for cooperative so far by passing the Rural 
Professional Cooperative Law, which establishes the legal status of rural cooperatives and 
urges all levels of government to support them. Compared to the support for dragon-head 
companies, however, the central government provided little substantive financial support to 
rural cooperatives. Instead, financial, technical, and physical support for cooperatives mainly 
comes from the local governments, which leads to regional variations in the growth of 
cooperative production. According to one national survey, by 2008, 68 percent of villages in 
China have received some form of government support for cooperatives and 30 percent have 
received financial support in the form of grants, subsidies, or tax exemptions (Deng et al., 
2010).  
Unlike both agribusiness-led vertical integration and rural cooperatives, which have 
received support from the central government, independent commercial and entrepreneurial 
family farms receive no direct central-level support. Their growth depends more on policy 
interventions by local governments, especially in the area of market building, such as 
building specialized trading centers in the local region that help to bring markets—both 
physically and relationally—within the reach of small independent producers. In the Chinese-
language literature, this model is referred to as “specialized market-led vertical integration” 
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(Niu, 2006; Huang, 2010b). In the past decade, “vertical integration” through all three 
channels has progressed extensively in Chinese agriculture. A report issued by the MOA 
estimates that, by 2005, half of the country’s farmland and farming households were engaged 
in “vertically integrated agriculture”—in other words, engaged in commodity agriculture 
through independent, cooperative, or corporate production (Huang, 2010b).  
 
Independent Household Production 
Because of the high costs of getting access to market information and market contacts, and 
especially, transporting goods to the physical marketplaces where transactions with 
processors, consumers, or merchants are conducted, small family producers can only start 
independent, household-based commodity agriculture when the physical marketplaces are 
easily accessible. In rural China, this condition is usually met in two ways: first, a rural area 
that has geographical proximity to urban consumers, and second, an area where some 
external actor—mainly the local state—has helped to create a stable marketplace locally.  
The peri-urban regions of most Chinese cities have a tradition of producing vegetables 
and animal products commercially to meet the urban consumption demand, thanks to their 
easy access to the urban market (Skinner, 1978). In these peri-urban rural areas, urban traders 
penetrate extensively; local wholesale or retail marketplaces that directly supply vegetables 
and other products to urban consumers are easily accessible to producers by motorized 
vehicles or even by traditional unmotorized tricycles. Today, independent household-based 
commodity agriculture remains active and the dominant type of agricultural activity in these 
areas. A study of horticultural production (including vegetables, fruits, and nuts) in the 
greater Beijing metropolitan area, for example, finds that an overwhelming majority (87 
percent) of horticultural products produced in this peri-urban region is procured through 
traditional supply channels, such as by itinerant small traders or in local periodic markets 
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(Wang et al., 2009). This study’s survey of 50 villages in this area further shows that 
“households sold almost all of their output to small traders—either in the village or in local 
wholesale markets” (Wang et al., 2009: 1796). Clearly, the market is easily accessible to 
small producers in these areas.  
Geographic proximity to urban markets plays a crucial role in fostering independent 
commodity production. The aforementioned Beijing study (Wang et al., 2009) finds that a 
greater distance from Beijing’s urban center significantly decreases the amount of land 
households devote to specialized horticultural production. It is only in the peri-urban rural 
areas, where the low cost of transportation has made access to itinerant small traders and 
local wholesale markets easy, that household producers with the needed capital, skill, and 
labor can fairly easily make the transition into independent, specialized commodity 
production. In fact, in 2004, a greater share of the horticultural production in Beijing’s peri-
urban areas came from low-income villages and households than from high-income villages 
and households, which shows that, on one hand, wealthier villages and households have 
shifted to other more profitable employment activities and, on the other, independent 
household-based commodity agriculture has a relatively low threshold of entry and high 
viability.  
I observed a similar pattern in the peri-urban regions around the cities of Zhangzhou 
漳州 and Xiamen 厦门 in Fujian province. In Shan’ge 山格 town in Pinghe 平和 county, 
which is about 30 kilometers from Zhangzhou City, for example, many local households are 
specializing in the commercial production of vegetables and fruits (mainly jujubes and 
pomelos). Along the thoroughfare that connects the town center to the cities of Zhangzhou 
and Xiamen, many traders—some of whom are former local farmers—have set up shops. 
Farmers ride on their motorcycles to deliver sacks of fruits to these shops regularly during the 
harvest season and get their crops weighed and are paid in cash on the spot. The fruits are 
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then cleaned, sorted, packaged in cardboard boxes that bear a brand name and the place of 
origin, and stored in the shops’ storage. Trucks sent in by contracted transporters arrive 
periodically to load up the fruits and ship them to urban wholesale markets.  
In peri-urban areas like these, the geographic proximity to urban markets makes the 
spontaneous market-building process by small private actors possible. Active involvement by 
the local state, albeit certainly helpful, is not a necessary condition. For rural areas that are 
not close to urban markets, however, local government becomes the most important actor in 
providing the market access needed for the risk-averse and information-deficient small 
household producers to shift to independent commodity production.  
Local governments in rural China often promote market access by literally “bringing 
markets to farmers”—i.e., building specialized trading centers in rural areas so that retailers, 
processors, and transporters will come in to buy the products that local commercial farmers 
specialize in producing. The most famous, widely studied, and replicated—and probably 
most successful—example of this kind is the Shouguang Vegetable Wholesale Market built 
in Shouguang county 寿光, Shandong province, the largest in the country. The market started 
in 1984 with just an old-style small vegetable market on 0.6 hectares of land allocated by the 
county government. Over the next two decades, the county government invested a total of 40 
million yuan and expanded the market nine times to its current scale: six specialized market 
centers covering 40 hectares of land, and annual sales of two million metric tons of 
vegetables of over 300 varieties. The market has brought in vegetable traders from all over 
the country. They have opened up operations in Shouguang to purchase products directly 
from small farmers and then integrate them into large volumes, before shipping them out to 
every corner of the country and foreign markets.  
For such markets to be functional, of course, local agricultural producers need to be 
able to produce products that meet the market demand. State and local public officials in 
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Shouguang also spearheaded the development and promotion of agricultural technologies that 
are required in commercial vegetable production. The party secretary of Sanyuanzhu 三元株
village, Mr. Wang Leyi 王乐义, has been widely credited with developing the technology of 
temperature-controlled greenhouses for year-round vegetable production. The county 
government then organized study trips to Sanyuanzhu village and sent technicians out to all 
over the county to help disseminate the technology to farmers free of charge. 
The easy access to the market and the dissemination of greenhouse vegetable 
production technology have made commercial vegetable farming a safe and profitable pursuit 
for small farmers in Shouguang: now over 80 percent of family farms in the county specialize 
in commercial vegetable farming, using 300,000 temperature-controlled greenhouses 
covering 53,000 hectares of land; 60 percent of rural household income in the county now 
comes from commercial vegetable farming (Huang, 2010b).  
Similar market-building efforts by local governments—although not always as 
successful—are found all over the country. In Chenggong county 呈贡, Yunnan, the county 
government built a fresh-flower trading center with hundreds of stalls for small farmers and a 
state-of-the-art auction center equipped with computerized trading systems. It has now grown 
into the largest of its kind in all of Asia. The local government also worked together with 
higher levels of government to designate special “green express lanes” on the highway 
connecting the county to the international airport in the nearby provincial capital of Kunming 
to speed up transportation. Local agricultural extension stations also helped with technical 
training and information dissemination. With this kind of state support for market-building, 
virtually all local farmers entered into independent commercial flower production (some in 
vegetable production to supply the nearby urban market). In other cases, although local 
governments stopped short of building new marketplaces, through disseminating technologies, 
providing material and financial support, and organizing a large number of farmers—
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especially cadre families—to pioneer the specialized production of a new crop, they created a 
large enough production base in the region to attract outside merchants and processors to 
bring in market access (Chen, 2012).  
Non-state actors can also become the main force in building market facilities and 
promoting market access. The multinational company Nestlé Foods, for example, has played 
such a role and facilitated the transition into independent commodity production of many 
local farmers in Pu’er prefecture 普洱 in Yunnan. Nearly two decades ago, Nestlé selected 
several areas in Yunnan, including Baoshan 保山 and Pu’er, as potential areas to procure 
coffee beans. Although Yunnan has the natural conditions for coffee production, local 
farmers had no tradition or knowledge of coffee production. Thus, Nestlé essentially did what 
the local government did in Shouguang: it provided training and technical services for coffee-
growing free of charge to any interested peasant and at the same time, set up many 
purchasing stations throughout the region. Nestlé, by establishing a long-term presence and 
procuring coffee beans here for its instant-coffee production in Guangdong province, has 
brought once remote market opportunities directly into the reach of small producers. The 
presence of Nestlé also encouraged other actors—for example, local township and village 
enterprises—to also enter the coffee market, further increasing market opportunities for 
producers. As a result, even though Pu’er is geographically remote and has negligible local 
demand for coffee-based products, many poor farming households in the area shifted into 
specialized coffee production and sell to Nestlé on the spot market.  
In both the peri-urban areas where market access has grown spontaneously and in 
areas where local state or non-state actors have actively engaged in building market facilities 
and disseminating market accesses that are openly accessible to small producers, market 
opportunities have been mostly provided by either small traders or local wholesale markets 
and usually are open to producers of all scales. Rural China’s legacy of collectivized 
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agriculture, relatively equal allocation of land among village members, strong public 
agricultural extension services, and the strong regulation of family reproductive behavior by 
the state have also limited the disparities among household producers in the same area in 
terms of skill, capital, and labor endowments. As a result, in these areas, the transition from 
subsistence peasant agriculture to independent, household-based commodity agriculture is 
usually something in which a large portion of the local agricultural population participates.2 
Such massive participation in independent commodity agriculture in an area creates a pattern 
of regional specialization in selected commodity products, which results in an increased 
scale—on a regional level—of such production and subsequently attracts even more market 
opportunities to the region, which helps to further fuel the growth of local independent 
commodity production and regional specialization. In the peri-urban regions surrounding the 
cities of Xiamen, Zhangzhou, and Quanzhou in southern Fujian, for example, neighboring 
villages in the same town each specialize in a different commodity, ranging from mushrooms, 
loquats, and bananas, to tea. In areas where the transition to specialized commodity 
production is facilitated by local governments, because households’ specialization is 
determined by the specialized trading centers built by local governments, spatial 
specialization tends to happen at a more aggregate level—the county level, for example, in 
2 The participation in specialized commodity production in a rural area is, of course, far from 
universal. Rural households adopt different economic strategies in allocating labor and other 
resources between family farming, migrant nonfarm work, and local nonfarm work. This 
creates unequal labor and capital endowments across farming households. But even for those 
who do not participate in commoditized agriculture, they usually do so because they have 
chosen to pursue more rewarding opportunities in nonfarm employment, rather than being 
excluded due to insufficient asset endowment. 
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vegetable production in Shouguang and fresh flower production in Chenggong—rather than 
at the township or village level.  
This type of massive participation in independent commodity production also means 
that most local households are using their allocated farmland productively, which severely 
restricts the availability of land on the local rental market in these densely populated areas 
already facing land scarcity. In many of these relatively developed peri-urban areas, rural 
industries are also competing for the precious land, further reducing its availability to 
agricultural producers who want to expand their scale of production. As a result, expansion of 
production through acquiring more land on the rental market becomes very difficult, if not 
impossible, and wage labor is usually only needed during peak seasons; commercial farming 
households that rely on family nonwage labor become the dominant type of agricultural 
producers in these areas. 
The emergence of labor-hiring entrepreneurial family farms in rural China depends 
primarily on the availability of land for the expansion of the scale of production.3 Land 
becomes available mainly in two situations. The first is in regions where there is a natural 
availability of land that allows for expanded-scale production. In Heilongjiang province, for 
example, the large-scale state farms have in recent years decollectivized. They allocated 
state-owned farmland to employee households on long-term leases just like rural villages did 
3 Strictly speaking, these farms that employ nonfamily wage labor are no longer family farms. 
They, however, share more similarities with family farms using nonwage labor than with the 
corporate farms discussed later. In these entrepreneurial farms, the farmer family usually 
remains the unit owning assets and organizing production. Their scale of labor hiring and 
land renting is usually quite small, employment relations remain informal, and no staff is 
employed.  
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with collectively owned farmland. They also encouraged employees to reclaim new land, 
which employees then have long-term use rights to. As a result, former state-farm employees 
now have farms on a scale unheard of in more densely populated parts of the country: the 
largest farm in Jiansanjiang State Farm 建三江农场 is over 10,000 hectares, while the 
average size of family farms in many parts of China is below one hectare. Not surprisingly, 
large-scale family-controlled farms such as this rely on hired migrant wage labor for their 
specialized production, mainly rice, soybeans, and corn. 
The other situation in which entrepreneurial farmers can emerge is when endowments 
of capital, skill, or land are more unevenly distributed within the local agricultural population. 
Under such conditions, a proportion of the population, due to their lack of skill, capital, or 
land, is excluded from profitable commodity agriculture. Their land is therefore not 
productively used, and the opportunity cost for them to rent out their land decreases, leading 
more of them to rent out their land to other commodity producers. Typically, such a process 
starts with the unequal allocation of collectively owned nonarable land—such as mountain 
slopes, wasteland, marshes, and forestland. In this unequal distribution, it is families that 
either have or are connected to local leaders that usually benefit. Allocation of village-
controlled nonarable land is much less constrained by the egalitarian principles that apply to 
basic farmland. Once gaining control of such land, these entrepreneurial families can expand 
the scale of production and hire wage labor.  
In An’ning county 安宁 in Yunnan, for example, an urban businessman, whose 
father-in-law happened to be a village chief, managed to rent hundreds of mu of mountain 
slopes in that village, which had previously been classified as wasteland, and built a 
commercial orchard, hiring migrant laborers to do the farming. In another case, in Shan’ge 
town in Pinghe county in Fujian, where we find wide participation of small family farms in 
commercial production of fruits and vegetables using their allocated farmland, a small 
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number of families are also growing eucalyptus trees—to supply to a local paper mill—on a 
large scale on collectively owned forestland. Other farming families are excluded from this 
because only these families—mostly families of village cadres and their relatives—had both 
the foresight and the capital to contract from the villages or rent from other households all the 
forestland. Chen’s (Chen, 2012) study of navel orange production in a county in southern 
Jiangxi reveals the same pattern of differentiation among farming households, whose access 
to forestland varies greatly. Some, deterred by the high risks in this new market endeavor, 
rented out all their forestland to pursue nonfarm wage work, while others—again, often cadre 
families under the prodding of the county government, which spearheaded the introduction of 
this new crop—rented in forestland and became labor-hiring large producers. In other cases, 
scare skills, such as those needed in growing certain high-value vegetables, also can also 
exclude some households from participating and lead them to pursue nonfarm jobs while 
renting out their land to those who have such skills.  
 
Corporate Production 
The penetration of agribusiness into agricultural production in China takes two forms: 
directly employing wage labor and managing agricultural production in corporate farms 
(corporate farming), and organizing multiple household producers into coordinated 
production through contract arrangements (contract farming). In both forms of corporate 
production, the direct producers—whether wage labor in corporate farms or nonwage family 
labor in contract farming households—no longer directly transact in the product market, but 
neither are they independent producers. Instead, they depend on agribusiness companies to 
both provide inputs and productive assets that enable but also control the production process 
and mediate their transactions with markets.  
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In the literature, the choice for agribusiness companies between contract farming and 
corporate farming is mainly seen as determined by the technical aspects of agriculture as a 
natural production process (Mann and Dickinson, 1978). When capital is not able to 
industrially organize an agricultural production that is more productive than small farmers (in 
other words, achieving economy of scale), it then chooses to settle off-farm or near-farm on 
the agricultural commodity chain and specializes in producing farm inputs and processing 
farm outputs, while leaving the natural process of agricultural production—the most risky 
part in the commodity chain—to small family farms through contract arrangements, which 
also allows companies to take advantage of the self-exploitation by small family farms of 
unpaid and flexible family labor. In other cases, when capital manages to industrialize 
agricultural production and attain higher productivity than small farms, it then chooses to 
directly organize agricultural production and employ wage labor to capture the surplus 
generated in that process. Although such an efficiency-driven consideration by agribusiness 
companies can certainly be relevant, this argument overlooks the often more important 
constraints and incentives in the local political economy that determine companies’ choice of 
specific forms of production, as the case of rural China shows. 
The kind of agribusiness companies doing contract farming in China runs the whole 
gamut: domestic and foreign, big and small, processors and retailers, exporters and domestic 
suppliers, public and private. When entering agriculture in China, these firms face a unique 
constraint: virtually all arable land is collectively owned and has been already allocated to 
rural households on a long-term basis. There are ways through which companies can gain 
access to land to set up corporate farms—for example, leasing unused land from villages and 
then reclaiming it, or renting land allocated to farmers from individual farmers or villages; 
but for most companies, contract farming becomes an important way of getting land and 
entering agriculture. 
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Agribusiness companies set up contract farming arrangements with household farmers 
in one of the following three patterns. First, in what is called the “company + household” 
model, agribusiness companies directly contract with rural households and set up terms of 
production and purchasing. In the second, “company + base + household” model, besides 
contracting with rural households, agribusiness companies also set up their own production 
bases—corporate farms using wage labor—on land they have gained direct control of, 
usually in the same geographic areas. In the third model, “company + intermediary + 
household,” companies establish contract arrangements with intermediary agents, who 
represent individual farmers in their dealings with companies. The most typical intermediary 
agents are producers’ cooperatives formed by rural households, but village authorities and 
even local governments may also act as the intermediary to sign contracts with companies 
and organize rural households’ production.  
Contract farming faces an inherent risk of defaulting. When agribusiness companies 
and household producers enter pre-production, pre-marketing contracts that require the 
delivery of a product at a specified price, quantity, and quality, there is almost always a loser: 
when the market price rises above the contracted price, farmers have an incentive to sell to 
open markets; when the opposite happens, companies have an incentive to buy from open 
markets—unless there is no alternative market outside the contract. Contract arrangements, 
therefore, are most stable when agribusiness companies have market monopsony and farmers 
are deprived of the opportunity of side-selling. Because farmers are intrinsically motivated to 
violate contract terms and legal enforcement is usually unpractical, for agribusiness 
companies, market monopsony is their best protection and, as a result, is a widely pursued 
strategy. The viability and stability of contract farming depends not on the essential nature of 
agriculture or of a certain crop, but on how successful companies are in creating and 
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maintaining market monopsony and how effective farmers can break it—both are determined 
by the constraints and motivations presented to them by the local political economy.  
From this perspective, the incompatibility between contract farming and independent 
household production becomes obvious: contract farming requires market monopsony, which 
means that the agribusiness company is the sole conduit between producers and the product 
market and therefore monopolizes access to markets. Independent household production, on 
the other hand, requires the easy and open access by small household producers to market 
opportunities. The presence of independent production of a given product in a local area, 
therefore, greatly threatens the stability of the contract farming of that product. Even if there 
are some households in the area that, for various reasons, cannot produce independently and 
are willing to enter contract farming, the presence of non-contract producers and thus other 
purchasers would effectively break the market monopsony that agribusiness companies need 
to suppress contract farmers’ side-selling and maintain stable contract relations.4 Not 
surprisingly, in both the secondary literature and the primary fieldwork, contract farming is 
virtually never found in the same area where independent household-based commodity 
production thrives. For example, a survey of 201 villages in the Beijing metropolitan region, 
where commercial vegetable production dominates, found no incidence of contract farming 
(Wang et al., 2009). In a statistical analysis of multi-province survey data, Guo Hongdong, 
Robert Jolly, and Zhu Jianhua (2007) found that proximity to markets strongly and 
significantly reduces farmers’ likelihood of joining contract farming. 
4 The only possibility for contract farming in the presence of independent production is to 
produce a differentiated product. But even in this situation, it is difficult for companies to 
prevent the diffusion of technologies and the adoption of that differentiated product by non-
contract producers. 
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Agribusiness companies in China have adopted various approaches to form de facto 
market monopsony. One fruit juice company in Yunnan’s Xishuangbanna 西双版纳 
prefecture, when facing high rates of farmers’ defaults in its initial peri-urban site of contract 
farming, where independent production also existed, shifted to a remote mountainous area to 
continue contract farming of tropical fruits so that farmers there were geographically locked 
into the company’s monopsony. Another widely used approach is only selecting for contract 
farming products that have no local market and can only reach the export market through the 
company. For example, the four companies Sachiko Miyata, Nicholas Minot, and Hu 
Dinghuan (2009) studied all sell above 90 percent of their products to either export markets 
or domestic supermarket chains, which also tend to require differentiated products. Even for 
these companies that control restricted access to distant markets, however, their monopsony 
is constantly threatened by merchants or processors who follow them into the area to get a 
share of the supply, bringing with them alternative access to markets. Take Nestlé’s operation 
in Yunnan for example. When Nestlé brought coffee cultivation into Yunnan, it initially 
started with contract farming. It, however, had to abandon contract farming later due to the 
rampant side-selling by coffee farmers to local processors and merchants who have followed 
Nestlé into this lucrative market. Nowadays, Nestlé simply maintains purchasing stations in 
production areas and buys coffee beans from commercial farmers on spot markets. 
The problem of side-selling by contract farmers threatens agribusiness companies’ 
ability to secure stable procurement of products and thus motivates companies in rural China 
to gain greater control over the production process by entering corporate farming. Many 
agribusiness companies in China adopt the “company + base + household” model, in which 
they engage in two forms of production simultaneously—wage-labor production in the 
corporate base farm and contract farming with household producers using nonwage labor. 
This practice is economically puzzling: if one form is more efficient, there is no need to adopt 
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the other. This has to be explained by the unique political economy in rural China: companies 
on one hand are pushed by contract producers’ side-selling to enter corporate farming, but on 
the other, are constrained by the scarcity of land and unable to meet all procurement needs 
from corporate farms alone. Apart from ensuring at least a partial supply of products, having 
corporate farms has another advantage: by controlling a substantial share of the local market 
in their own base farms, companies not only can drive down the market price but also reduce 
the opportunity for open spot transactions, both of which limit farmers’ ability of side-selling. 
Therefore, agribusiness companies in rural China use contract farming to supplement 
corporate farming and use corporate farming to stabilize contract farming. For example, 
Xinchang 新昌 Foods, a poultry meat processing company in Shandong province, receives 40 
percent of the poultry that it processes for multinational fast-food chains from about 10,000 
farmer households in Changyi 昌邑 and neighboring counties, who produce for the company 
on contract. But the company also runs a base farm on land leased from villages that provides 
another 40 to 50 percent of its poultry supply. Similarly, all four companies studied in Miyata, 
Minot, and Hu (2009) have base farms, including one that only provides 5 percent of one 
company’s procurement. 
Not surprisingly, in rural China, sole reliance on corporate farming by an agribusiness 
company is mostly seen in areas where the availability of land can meet the scale requirement 
of the corporate farms. Land for corporate farms can come from two sources, as mentioned 
earlier: leasing unused land from villages, or renting allocated land from a large number of 
individual households, which is mostly brokered by the village authorities. This means that 
large, stand-alone corporate farms are found in three types of areas: first, areas that are 
geographically remote and sparsely populated; second, areas where households are willing to 
rent out their land and work as employees in corporate farms that provide higher incomes; 
and third, areas where even though households can independently engage in commodity 
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production, companies nevertheless are able to use strong support from and connections with 
local governments and village authorities to either strong-arm households into renting out 
their land or buy-off farmers. Therefore, just like contract farming, corporate farming faces 
competition from independent production, as these forms of production increase the value of 
rural households’ farmland and make them less likely to rent out land to companies.  
Availability of wage labor, on the other hand, is usually not a constraint that limits the 
emergence of corporate farms. Even if we assume that corporate farms have a similar level of 
productivity as family farms and thus are not able to pay high enough wages to attract local 
labor from family farming into wage work, migrant labor from poorer parts of the country is 
usually available to meet companies’ labor needs. In Dahongpo 大红坡 coffee plantation in 
Baoshan, Yunnan, the hundreds of wage workers mostly hailed from Zhaotong 昭通 
prefecture, one of the poorest areas in the province. In other corporate farms in Fujian and 
Shandong, migrant workers from Yunnan and Guizhou formed the main workforce.  
Among the provinces I study, Yunnan is the one where large, stand-alone corporate 
farms are the most prevalent, for all the above reasons. Even in places where local 
households are engaged in independent production, like commercial coffee farmers in Pu’er, 
the availability of unused land and supply of migrant labor still allow corporate farms to 
emerge, right adjacent to small family farms. In contrast, in southern Fujian, where 
population density is high and independent production highly developed, I found no presence 
of stand-alone corporate farms. Similarly, in the more densely populated peri-urban areas of 
Yunnan, such as Chenggong county, where thriving independent production by rural 
households restricts land supply to corporate farms, no presence of large-scale corporate 
farming is found. In Shandong, thanks to strong support from local governments, 
agribusiness companies grew rapidly; the limited availability of land, however, still restricted 
their scale of production. Most corporate farms here are, as mentioned above, supplemented 
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by contract farming. Furthermore, in areas where independent production is more developed, 
such as Shouguang, the presence of corporate farms is much more limited compared to areas 
where independent production is less developed, such as Anqiu 安丘 and Changyi, both in 
Weifang City 潍坊. 
 
Cooperative Production: A Third Way? 
Cooperative production usually emerges in three types of situations. First, when a substantial 
number of family farms in an area are already doing independent commercial production, 
they may find it more beneficial—actually in almost all cases, this should be true—if they 
join forces in their dealings on markets or even coordinate their otherwise independent 
production. The benefits of joining forces to form producer cooperatives are obvious: the 
cooperatives can buy inputs at bulk and discounted prices, raise productivity and product 
quality through disseminating information and providing technical services, standardize 
production, secure finances, shield farmers from risks by pooling resources, and even gain 
forward linkage into the more profitable downstream segments through marketing and 
processing the products.5 
A second type of situation in which cooperatives can emerge is when small household 
producers face difficulties in gaining either productive assets such as skill and capital or 
market accesses to enter commoditized agriculture, yet neither the local government nor 
outside market actors are bringing in market access. Outside purchasers will not come in 
unless there is a sufficient scale of production of a product that is not easily available—at 
least at a comparable price—on the existing market; and it is impossible for individual 
5 The benefits of rural cooperatives to farmers are widely known in the development literature. 
For a general review, see Staatz, 1987.  
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households to either reach that scale or venture out to find markets for the products on their 
own. In the absence of local government support, cooperatives, which organize a sufficient 
number of households into specialized production to reach a marketable scale and thus bring 
in outside market actors, are the only alternative that can possibly bridge this gap between 
distant markets and small and isolated household producers. Cooperatives of course are also 
crucial in providing productive assets such as skills and capital to small producers to assist 
their transition into specialized commercial production.  
Clearly, in both situations, but especially the latter, it is crucial to have a local social 
infrastructure—for example, a source of leadership, a relatively high level of trust, and the 
absence of severe socioeconomic differentiation among households—to overcome obstacles 
to collective action. In rural China, collective authorities or individual village leaders often 
have become the leading force in organizing rural households to form cooperative 
organizations. In Yinzhaozhai 阴赵砦 village, Xingyang county 荥阳, Henan, for example, 
the village’s successful wheat breeding cooperative is the brainchild of the village party 
secretary, Mr. Yin. He conceived the cooperative ten years ago as the only way for this 
farming village to raise its income, and persuaded villagers to join. Similar cases can be 
found in the Chinese-language literature, for example, Han Shuming (2007) and Zhou 
Yanping, Chen Huiying, and Jiang Aiping (2002). But the difficulties faced by these bottom-
up, spontaneous cooperatives are illustrated in the widely publicized case of Nanmazhuang 
南马庄 village, in Henan’s Lankao county 兰考. Despite the successful internal mobilization 
to form a cooperative within the village, led by the able village leader, the main product—
organic rice—still faced a cold reaction on the market, not surprising given the cooperative’s 
inability to either publicize it or place it with major retail chains. The venture was only 
salvaged after a professor from Beijing, who was seconded to the county government and 
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attached to this village, took some rice to sell in Beijing and caught the attention of the 
media—a form of outside intervention that is surely irreplicable elsewhere.  
Then, there is also a third type of situation where cooperatives can more easily form, 
but not necessarily in a healthy way. Instead of being formed bottom-up and spontaneously 
by household producers, cooperatives can also be formed in a top-down manner by more 
powerful local actors, including local governments (especially agriculture-related agencies), 
agribusiness companies, and large entrepreneurial producers. In keeping with the local 
corporatism model that had fueled the growth of township and village enterprises, the state 
has resorted to the same approach to mobilize grassroots governments to lead the 
development of rural cooperatives. Studies have found that increasing support from local 
governments is strongly associated with growth in rural cooperatives (Deng et al., 2010). One 
study found that, in Weifang City in Shandong, an area where rural cooperatives have seen 
rapid growth in recent years thanks to the local government’s strong support since 2004, the 
number of cooperatives had increased to 2,324 by 2006 (92.2 percent of which are producer 
cooperatives), with a total of 460,000 members—about 45 percent of the county’s 
agricultural labor force (Han, 2007).  
The high growth rate in recent years, and especially the strong hand of local 
governments in pushing this growth, however, is a mixed blessing at best. Experiences in 
other countries have shown that excessive government interference has been the leading 
cause of politicization and inefficiency in cooperatives and of their decline and even eventual 
dissolution (Baviskar and Attwood, 1995). Similar experiences are also found in China (Lu, 
Deng, and Li, 2011).  
The word “cooperative” has become to mean many things in rural China. From 
visiting cooperatives during fieldwork and reading media reports of cooperatives that are 
lauded as success stories, I find that it is not unusual that some cooperatives are neither 
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producer cooperatives nor producer shareholding companies, and have little to do with 
organizing households into coordinated commodity production. Some exist in name only and 
were set up by village authorities or local officials to answer to upper-level pressure about 
promoting cooperatives. Others are professional associations that mainly provide members 
supplementary pre- or post-production services in information sharing and product promotion 
but are not involved in the production process. Even worse, local elites can also strategically 
use cooperatives for their own interests.  
Unlike small-scale commercial farmers, labor-hiring entrepreneurial farmers, who 
have already shifted to commodity production on their own—and quite successfully so, 
otherwise they wouldn’t have expanded their production by hiring labor and renting more 
land—have much less incentive to join a producer cooperative. Thus, the cooperatives they 
form typically take the form of professional associations, and are mainly for the purpose of 
disseminating market information, sharing skills, and coordinating market strategies.  
Besides that, large labor-hiring entrepreneurial farmers can also be a force that 
inhibits the healthy development of cooperatives. In some cases, large entrepreneurial 
farmers have formed cooperatives to capture both state subsidies for rural cooperatives and 
the reduced transaction costs in dealing with suppliers or purchasers. A few small farmers 
have been included in these cooperatives, but big farmers have taken the lion’s share of the 
benefits. Even worse, by forming these cooperatives, big farmers can act as the middleman, 
and profit from the difference between the wholesale price given to the cooperatives and the 
price offered to smaller members of the cooperative. Agribusiness companies and 
commercialized government agencies are equally enthusiastic in forming cooperatives by 
simply re-branding themselves to get a share of state subsidies (Tong and Wen, 2009). One 
study finds that among the 136 cooperatives in a particular city, 125 were formed by big, 
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entrepreneurial farmers, four by government agencies, five by dragon-head firms, and only 
two by villagers (Zhang Xiaoshan, 2005). 
Reliable data that allow for a more rigorous analysis of local conditions that influence 
the growth of cooperative production in an area are not yet available. But the discussion 
above suggests two hypotheses. First, there appears to be a competitive relationship between 
entrepreneurial farmers and agribusiness on one side and producer cooperatives on the other. 
In an area where entrepreneurial farmers or agribusinesses have gained dominance, the 
growth of producer cooperatives for smaller commercial households will likely be stunted. 
Second, when a strong social infrastructure for collective action is present, there are higher 
chances of cooperatives being successful. Having some external impetus—such as a company 
searching for producers to meet its demand for differentiated products or a local government 
actively supporting cooperatives—will further enhance the chances of cooperatives being 
successful; but if the two internal conditions are absent, the external impetus may only result 
in the short-lived or nonfunctioning cooperatives we see widely in today’s rural China. 
 
Conclusions and Discussion 
A comparison of the competing models of agrarian transition in rural China shows that 
variations are primarily created by different conditions in the local political economy. When 
markets are openly and easily accessible to small family producers—due to either the local 
government’s effort in market building or the spontaneous spreading of market access in peri-
urban areas by market actors—independent household production becomes the dominant 
form of commoditized agriculture. In areas where opportunities for independent production 
are lacking, family farms can still enter commodity production—without being dissolved into 
individual wage workers employed by agribusiness companies—through forming producer 
cooperatives and collectively gaining market accesses. The ability of local households to 
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enter cooperative production, however, depends on both external conditions—such as the 
presence of unmet market demand for differentiated products and support from local 
governments—and internal conditions—strong collective leadership that helps to organize 
collective action and the relative weakness of entrepreneurial farmers and agribusiness. For 
agribusiness companies in China, the greater challenge they face in entering agricultural 
production is not some natural obstacles rooted in the biological and land-based nature of 
agriculture, but rather competition from independent household production. Therefore, 
corporate production—in the form of either contract farming or corporate farming—only 
thrives in places where the local political economy is unfavorable to independent production: 
for contract farming, the lack of locally accessible market opportunities, which allow 
companies to have market monopsony; and for corporate farming, the availability of land, 
which is often made possible with the help of local government or village authorities. 
These findings here are just hypotheses awaiting further confirmation. One theoretical 
insight from these findings is that the divergence between family farming and corporate 
agriculture is not so much determined in the production realm, but more in the circulation 
realm—especially in how producers interface with the product market. Both the orthodox 
Marxist-Leninist approach and the Chayanovian approach focus primarily on the production 
process and try to determine either the superiority of capitalist farms or resilience of family 
farms on the basis of some advantages in the production process—for example, the former’s 
economy of scale, and the latter’s insensitivity to declining marginal labor productivity and 
the ability of self-exploitation. The famous and long-standing debate on the inverse 
relationship between farm size and productivity is an illustration of this (Bramall, 2004; 
Patnaik, 1979; Sen, 1962). What this study suggests, however, is that the importance of these 
differences in the production process in determining which form of production gains 
dominance is overestimated. In fact, neither form has an intrinsic advantage in the production 
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process that cannot be offset by changes in the production function—i.e., how various 
productive assets are combined and utilized.  
This leads to two tentative propositions. First, external conditions in the local political 
economy—rather than some essential, intrinsic qualities—are more decisive in determining 
how productive and competitive a particular form of production is. If the confrontation 
between family farms and agro-capital were determined by the natural characteristics of 
agriculture rather than local political economy conditions, then we would never see the kind 
of coexistence of independent, household-based commercial coffee farmers, large corporate 
coffee plantations relying solely on wage labor, and household farmers producing coffee 
under contract for local processors—such as we see in Pu’er, Yunnan—in the same area. The 
same form of production can also have widely different results in different locations. For 
example, the large-scale coffee plantation I studied in Yunnan is quite successful, thanks to 
the availability of migrant labor; yet an experiment with large-scale, labor-hiring rice farming 
in Anhui failed because of stringent labor supply in a local economy where nonfarm job 
opportunities existed (Wang and Gui, 2011).  
Second, advantages in markets are equally if not more important than those in the 
production process in determining the strength of various forms of production. The resilience 
of family farms in the face of the penetration of capital into agriculture is based less on 
natural obstacles in agricultural production, than on their ability to independently access 
market opportunities. Only when they have such access can the natural obstacles help sustain 
them in competition with corporate production using wage labor. Conversely, the success of 
agro-capital in taking control over land and proletarianizing labor from family farms also 
depends more on how successful they are in restricting family producers’ access to markets.  
  This view also suggests that if we narrowly focus on the production sphere, we may 
mistakenly conclude that the persisting dominance of family farms in today’s Chinese 
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agriculture evidences the lack of penetration by capital or the suppression of the logic of 
capital. But if we abandon the sectoral and reified conception of agriculture, and instead see it 
as an ongoing trans-sectoral organization of natural processes, embedded in the larger 
circulation of capital in agro-industrial complexes, we may in fact find that it is more 
advantageous for capital to settle in the circulation processes where it can more effectively 
appropriate the surplus from direct producers by virtue of its greater power in markets. 
Recent studies have shown that, in various places, commercial capital is gaining oligopolistic 
and even monopolistic control in every step along the circulation process that brings 
agricultural products to consumers—from rural procurement to urban wholesale and retail 
(Wu, 2012; Zhang and Pan, 2013; Zhong and Kong, 2010). By doing so, it pockets a greater 
surplus for itself and drives down the profit margins of direct producers. For family producers 
in today’s China, their relationship with commercial capital, which determines their position 
on markets, may have become more crucial than those with capital in the production process 
(Huang, 2012). In this sense, the more important transformation that capital can bring to 
Chinese agriculture is not the dissolution of family farms or the proletarianization of the rural 
labor force, but rather the integration of agricultural production into the trans-sectoral 
circulation of capital, which then subjects family producers to the surplus transfer in market 
processes.  
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